Institutional Breakdown and International Cooperation: the European Agreement to Recognize Croatia and Slovenia Journal Article uri icon



  • Using the logic of a two-phase cooperation framework (first bargaining to reach an agreement, then enforcement of the negotiated agreement), this article examines how the risk of institutional breakdown can help promote international cooperation. I argue first that the risk of institutional breakdown can help promote bargaining cooperation by raising the opportunity costs of bargaining failure, thus providing a strong incentive for states who value the fragile international institution to negotiate a cooperative agreement. Having helped states to reach a cooperative bargain, the risk of institutional breakdown can also play a role in the subsequent enforcement phase. I argue second that the risk of valued institutional breakdown can reduce state preferences for defection, moving the enforcement problem away from the standard Prisoners' Dilemma structure. To illustrate these arguments, I examine the European Community's decision to recognize the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia.

publication date

  • December 1, 2002

has restriction

  • closed

Date in CU Experts

  • November 1, 2013 11:20 AM

Full Author List


author count

  • 1

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1354-0661

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1460-3713

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 471

end page

  • 497


  • 8


  • 4