When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions Journal Article uri icon

Overview

abstract

  • We show that asymmetry in bidders’ capacity; constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting; competitive outcomes in multi-unit auctions in which the final value of; the good is common knowledge. This effect appears to be related to the; increased difficulty of coordination when there are significant; differences between bidders. Due to its impact on collusive outcomes,; asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller’s; revenue than does the auction type. Consistent with the finding in Sade et; al. (2006) that the discriminatory auction is more susceptible to; collusion than the uniform-price auction, asymmetry in capacity; constraints has a greater impact in discriminatory auctions. Copyright Oxford University Press 2006

publication date

  • September 1, 2006

Full Author List

  • Sade O; Schnitzlein C; Zender J

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 389

end page

  • 416

volume

  • 10

issue

  • 3