Channel Auctions Journal Article uri icon

Overview

abstract

  • Standard auction formats feature either an upper bound on the equilibrium price that descends over time (as in the Dutch auction) or a lower bound on the equilibrium price that ascends over time (as in the English auction). We show that in some settings with costly information acquisition, auctions featuring both (viz., a narrowing channel of prices) outperform the standard formats. This Channel auction preserves some of benefits of both the English (truthful revelation) and Dutch (security for necessary information acquisition) auctions. Natural applications include housing, online auction sites like eBay, recording transactions on blockchains, and spectrum rights. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.

publication date

  • May 1, 2020

Date in CU Experts

  • February 1, 2021 11:22 AM

Full Author List

  • Azevedo EM; Pennock DM; Waggoner B; Weyl EG

author count

  • 4

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0025-1909

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1526-5501

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 2075

end page

  • 2082

volume

  • 66

issue

  • 5