Repetition, Reputation, and Raiding.
Journal Article
Overview
abstract
I develop a multitarget takeover model with bid revisions, in which; bidders desire a reputation for having low valuations. Such a reputation; increases the likelihood that future targets will accept low premium bids.; Bidders develop reputation by using low take-it-or-leave-it offers.; Consequently, tender premiums bid revision rates, and success rates are; lower for continuing bidders than for those considering only a single; target. Success rates vary within a series, and reputation building is; more likely with highly correlated target valuations. I provide an; exploratory empirical analysis consistent with lower premiums from; continuing bidders and discuss some resulting implications regarding; "raiders," conglomerates, and resistance strategies. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies; in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
