Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market Journal Article uri icon

Overview

abstract

  • We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses. When the labor-market return to schooling rises, home production demands less time, and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken, more women may invest in schooling than men. (JEL I21, J12, J24, J31)

publication date

  • December 1, 2009

Full Author List

  • Chiappori P-A; Iyigun M; Weiss Y

Other Profiles

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 1689

end page

  • 1713

volume

  • 99

issue

  • 5